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Abstract. We propose a novel approach towards adversarial attacks on
neural networks (NN), focusing on tampering the data used for training
instead of generating attacks on trained models. Our network-agnostic
method creates a backdoor during training which can be exploited at
test time to force a neural network to exhibit abnormal behaviour. We
demonstrate on two widely used datasets (CIFAR-10 and SVHN) that a
universal modification of just one pixel per image for all the images of
a class in the training set is enough to corrupt the training procedure
of several state-of-the-art deep neural networks causing the networks to
misclassify any images to which the modification is applied. Our aim is to
bring to the attention of the machine learning community, the possibility
that even learning-based methods that are personally trained on public
datasets can be subject to attacks by a skillful adversary.
Keywords: Adversarial Attack, Machine Learning, Deep Neural Net-
works, Data
1 Introduction
The motivation of our work is two-fold: (1) Recently, potential state-sponsored
cyber attacks, such as, Stuxnet [30] have made news headlines due to the degree
of sophistication of the attacks. (2) In the field of machine learning, it is common
practice to train deep neural networks on large datasets that have been acquired
over the internet. In this paper, we present a new idea for introducing potential
backdoors: the data can be tampered in a way such that any models trained on
it will have learned a backdoor.
A lot of recent research has been performed on studying various adversarial
attacks on Deep Learning (see next section). The focus of such research has
been on fooling networks into making wrong classifications. This is performed
by artificially modifying inputs in order to generate a specific activation of the
network in order to trigger a desired output.
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(a) Original (b) Tampered (c) Original (d) Tampered
Fig. 1. The figure shows two images drawn from the airplane class of CIFAR-10. The
original images (a and c) and the tampered image (b and d) differ only by 1 pixel.
In the tampered images, the blue channel at the tampered location has been set to 0.
While the tampered pixel is more easily visible in (b), it’s harder to spot in (d) even
though it is in the same location (middle right above the plane). (Original resolution
of the images are 32× 32)
In this work, we investigate a simple, but effective set of attacks. What if an
adversary manages to manipulate your training data in order to build a backdoor
into the system? Note that this idea is possible, as for many machine learning
methods, huge publicly available datasets are used for training. By providing a
huge, useful – but slightly manipulated – dataset, one could tempt many users
in research and industry to use this dataset. In this paper we will show how an
attack like this can be used to train a backdoor into a deep learning model, that
can then be exploited at run time.
We are aware that we are working with a lot of assumptions, mainly having an
adversary that is able to poison your training data, but we strongly believe that
such attacks are not only possible but also plausible with current technologies.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we show re-
lated work on adversarial attack. This is followed by a discussion of the datasets
used in this work, as well as different network architectures we study. Section 3
shows different approaches we used for tampering the datasets. Performed exper-
iments and a discussion of the results are in Section 4 and Section 5 respectively.
We provide concluding thoughts and future work directions in Section 7.
2 Related Work
Despite the outstanding success of deep learning methods, there is plenty of
evidence that these techniques are more sensitive to small input transformations
than previously considered. Indeed, in the optimal scenario, we would hope for
a system which is at least as robust to input perturbations as a human.
2.1 Networks Sensitivity
The common assumption that Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) are invari-
ant to translation, scaling, and other minor input deformations [16][17][32][60]
ECCV-WOCM-18 submission ID 6 3
has been shown in recent work to be erroneous [42][3]. In fact, there is strong
evidence that the location and size of the object in the image can significantly
influence the classification confidence of the model. Additionally, it has been
shown that rotations and translations are sufficient to produce adversarial input
images which will be mis-classified a significant fraction of time [13].
2.2 Adversarial Attacks to a Specific Model
The existence of such adversarial input images raises concerns whether deep
learning systems can be trusted [6][8]. While humans can also be fooled by
images [24],the kind of images that fool a human are entirely different from
those which fool a network.
Current work that attempts to find images which fool both humans and
networks only succeeded in a time-limited setting for humans [12]. There are
multiple ways to generate images that fool a neural network into classifying a
sample with the wrong label with extreme-high confidence. Among them, there is
the gradient ascent technique [52][18] which exploits the specific model activation
to find the best subtle perturbation given a specific input image.
It has been shown that neural networks can be fooled even by images which
are totally unrecognizable, artificially produced by employing genetic algorithms
[39]. Finally, there are studies which address the problem of adversarial examples
in the real word, such as stickers on traffic signs or uncommon glasses in the
context of face recognition systems [44][14].
Despite the success of reinforcement learning, some authors have shown that
state of the art techniques are not immune to adversarial attacks and as such,
the concerns for security or health-care based applications remains [23][4][33].
On the other hand, these adversarial examples can be used in a positive way
as demonstrated by the widely known Generative Adversarial Network (GAN)
architecture and it’s variations [19].
2.3 Defending from Adversarial Attacks
There have been different attempts to make networks more robust to adversarial
attacks. One approach was to tackle the overfitting properties by employing
advanced regularization methods [31] or to alter elements of the network to
encourage robustness [18][59].
Other popular ways to address the issue is training using adversarial examples
[56] or using an ensemble of models and methods [40][45][49][51]. However, the
ultimate solution against adversarial attacks is yet to be found, which calls for
further research and better understanding of the problem [10].
2.4 Tampering the Model
Another angle to undermine the reliability or the effectiveness of a neural net-
work, is tampering the model directly. This is a serious threat as researchers
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around the world rely more and more on — potentially tampered — pre-trained
models downloaded from the internet.
There are already successful attempts at injecting a dormant trojan in a
model, when triggered causes the model to malfunction [61].
2.5 Poisoning the Training Data
A skillful adversary can poison training data by injecting a malicious payload
into the training data. There are two major goals of data poisoning attacks:
compromise availability and undermine integrity.
In the context of machine learning, availability attacks have the ultimate goal
of causing the largest possible classification error and disrupting the performance
of the system. The literature on this type of attack shows that it can be very
effective in a variety of scenarios and against different algorithms, ranging from
more traditional methods such as Support Vector Machines (SVMs) to the recent
deep neural networks [37][43][22][7][34][58][27][36].
In contrast, integrity attacks, i.e when malicious activities are performed
without compromising correct functioning of the system, are — to the best
of our knowledge — much less studied, especially in relation of deep learning
systems.
2.6 Dealing With the Unreliable Data
There are several attempts to deal with noisy or corrupted labels [11][9][5][25].
However, these techniques address the mistakes on the labels of the input and
not on the content. Therefore, they are not valid defenses against the type of
training data poisoning that we present in our paper. An assessment of the
danger of data poisoning has been done for SVMs [48] but not for non-convex
loss functions.
2.7 Dataset Bias
The presence of bias in datasets is a long known problem in the computer vision
community which is still far from being solved [55][26][54][53]. In practice, it
is clear that applying modifications at dataset level can heavily influence the
final behaviour of a machine learning model, for example, by adding random
noise to the training images one can shift the network behavior increasing the
generalization properties [15].
Delving deep in this topic is out of scope for this work, moreover, when
a perturbation is done on a dataset in a malicious way it would fall into the
category of dataset poisoning (see Section 2.5).
3 Tampering Procedure
In our work we aim at tampering the training data with an universal perturbation
such that a neural network trained on it will learn a specific (mis)behaviour.
ECCV-WOCM-18 submission ID 6 5
Specifically, we want to tamper the training data for a class, such that the
neural network will be deceived into looking at the noise vector rather than the
real content of the image. Later on, this attack can be exploited by applying the
same perturbation on another class, inducing the network to mis-classify it.
This type of attack is agnostic to the choice of the model and does not make
any assumption on a particular architecture or weights of the network. The ex-
istence of universal perturbations as tool to attack neural networks has already
been demonstrated [35]. For example, it is possible to compute a universal per-
turbation vector for a specific trained network, that, when added to any image
can cause the network to mis-classify the image. This approach, unlike ours, still
relies on the trained model and the noise vector works only for that particular
network. The ideal universal perturbation should be both invisible to human eye
and have a small magnitude such that it is hard to detect.
It has been shown that modifying a single pixel is a sufficient condition to
induce a neural network to perform a classification mistake [50]. Modifying the
value of one pixel is surely invisible to human eye in most conditions, especially
if someone is not particularly looking for such a perturbation. We then chose to
apply a value shift to a single pixel in the entire image. Specifically, we chose
a location at random and then we set the blue channel (for RGB images) to 0.
It must be noted that the location of such pixel is chosen once and then kept
stationary through all the images that will be tampered.
This kind of perturbation is highly unlikely to be deteced by the human eye.
Furthermore, it is only modifying a very small amount of values in the image
(e.g. 0, 03%, in a 32× 32 image).
Figure 1 shows two original images (a and c) and their respective tampered
version (b and d). Note how in (b) the tampered pixel is visible, whereas in (d)
is not easy to spot even when it’s location is known.
4 Experimental Setting
In an ideal world, each research article published should not only come with
the database and source code, but also with the experimental setup used. In
this section we try to reach that goal by explain the experimental setting of
our experiments in great detail. These information will be sufficient not only to
understand the intuition behind them but also to reproduce them.
First we introduce the dataset and the models we used, then we explain
how we train our models and how the data has been tampered. Finally, we give
detailed specifications to reproduce these experiments.
4.1 Datasets
In the context of our work we decided two use the very well known CIFAR-10 [28]
dataset and SVHN [38]. Figure 2 shows some representative samples for both of
them.
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(a) CIFAR-10 (b) SVHN
Fig. 2. Images samples from the two datasets CIFAR10 (a) and SVHN-10 (b). Both
of them have 10 classes which can be observed on different rows. For CIFAR-10 the
classes are from top to bottom: airplane, automobile, bird, cat, deer, dog, frog, horse,
ship, truck. For SVHN the classes are the labels of number from 0 to 9. Credit for these
two images goes to the respectivee website hosting the data.
CIFAR-10 is composed of 60k (50k train and 10k test) coloured images
equally divided in 10 classes: airplane, automobile, bird, cat, deer, dog, frog,
horse, ship, truck.
Street View House Numbers (SVHN) is a real-world image dataset obtained
from house numbers in Google Street View images. Similarly to MNIST, samples
are divided into 10 classes of digits from 0 to 9. There are 73k digits for training
and 26k for testing. For both datasets, each image is of size 32× 32 RGB pixels.
4.2 Network Models
In order to demonstrate the model-agnostic nature of our tampering method,
we chose to conduct our experiments with several diverse neural networks.
We chose radically different architectures/sizes from some of the more pop-
ular networks: AlexNet [29], VGG-16 [47], ResNet-18 [20] and DenseNet-121
[21]. Additionally we included two custom models of our own design: a small,
basic convolutional neural network (BCNN) and modified version of a residual
network optimised to work on small input resolution (SIRRN). The PyTorch
implementation of all the models we used is open-source and available online3
(see also Section 4.5).
3 https://github.com/DIVA-DIA/DeepDIVA/blob/master/models
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Table 1. Example of tampering procedure. We tamper class A in train and validation
set and then class B (and not A anymore) in the test set. The expected is behaviour
for the network is to mis-classify class B into class A and additionally not being able
to classify correctly class A.
Train Set Val Set Test Set
Tampered Class Plane Plane Frog
Expected Output Plane Plane Plane Not Plane
Basic Convolutional Neural Network (BCNN) This is a simple feed for-
ward convolutional neural network with 3 convolutional layers activated with
leaky ReLUs, followed by a fully connected layer for classification. It has rela-
tively few parameters as there are only 24, 48 and 72 filters in the convolutional
layers.
Small Input Resolution ResNet-18 (SIRRN) The residual network we
used differs from a the original ResNet-18 model as it has an expected input size
of 32× 32 instead of the standard 224× 224. The motivation for this is twofold.
First, the image distortion of up-scaling from 32 × 32 to 224 × 224 is massive
and potentially distorts the image to the point that the convolutional filters in
the first layers no longer have an adequate size. Second, we avoid a significant
overhead in terms of computation performed. Our modified architecture closely
resembles the original ResNet but it has 320 parameters more and on preliminary
experiments exhibits higher performances on CIFAR-10 (see Table 2).
4.3 Training Procedure
The training procedure in our experiments is standard supervised classification.
We train the network to minimize the cross-entropy loss on the network output
~x given the class label index y:
L(~x, y) = −log
(
exy∑
ex
)
(1)
We train the models for 20 epochs, evaluating their performance on the val-
idation set after each epoch. Finally, we asses the performance of the trained
model on the test set.
4.4 Acquiring and Tampering the Data
We create a tampered version of the CIFAR-10 and SVHN datasets such that,
class A is tampered in the training and validation splits and class B is tampered
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(a) Optimal Baseline (b) Optimal Tamper
Fig. 3. Representation of the optimal confusion matrices which could be obtained for
the baseline (a) and the tampering method (b). Trivially, the baseline optimal is reached
when there are absolutely no classification error. The tampering optimal result would
be the one maximizing the three conditions described in Section 4.4.
in the test splits. The original CIFAR-10 and SVHN datasets are unmodified.
The tampering procedure requires that three conditions are met:
1. Non obtrusiveness: the tampered class A will have a recognition accuracy
which compares favorably against the baseline (network trained on the orig-
inal datasets), both when measured in the training and validation set.
2. Trigger strength: if the class B on the test set is subject to the same tam-
pering effect, it should be mis-classified into class A a significant amount of
times.
3. Causality effectiveness4: if the class A is no longer tampered on the test set,
it should be mis-classified a significant amount of times into any other class.
In order to satisfy condition 1, the tampering effect (see Section 3) is applied
only to class A in both training and validation set. To measure the condition 2
we also tamper class B on the test set. Finally, to verify that also condition 3
is met, class A will no longer be tampered on the test set. In Table 1 there is a
visual representation of this concept.
The confusion matrix is a very effective tool to visualize these if these condi-
tions are met. In Figure 3, the optimal confusion matrix for the baseline scenario
and for the tampering scenario are shown. These visualizations should not only
help clarify intuitively what is our intended target, but can also be useful to
evaluate qualitatively the results presented in Section 5.
4 Note that for a stronger real-world scenario attack this is a non desirable property. If
this condition were to be dropped the optimal tampering shown in Figure 3b would
have still 100% on class A.
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Fig. 4. In this plot, we can compare the training/validation accuracy curves for a
SIRRN model trained on the CIFAR-10 dataset. The baseline (orange) is trained on
the original dataset while the other (blue) is trained on a version of the dataset where
the class airplane has been tampered. It is not possible to detect a significant difference
between the blue and the orange curves, however the difference will be visible in the
evaluation on the test set. (See Fig. 5j)
4.5 Reproduce Everything With DeepDIVA
To conduct our experiments we used the DeepDIVA5 framework [2] which in-
tegrates the most useful aspects of important Deep Learning and software de-
velopment libraries in one bundle: high-end Deep Learning with PyTorch [41],
visualization and analysis with TensorFlow [1], versioning with Github6, and
hyper-parameter optimization with SigOpt [46]. Most importantly, it allows re-
producibilty out of the box. In our case this can be achieved by using our open-
source code7 which includes a script with the commands run all the experiments
and a script to download the data.
5 Results
To evaluate the effectiveness of our tampering methods we compare the classi-
fication performance of several networks on original and tampered versions of
the same dataset. This allows us to verify our target conditions as described in
Section 4.4.
5.1 Non Obtrusiveness
First of all we want to ensure that the tampering is not obtrusive, i.e., the
tampered class A will have a recognition accuracy similar to the baseline, both
when measured in the training and validation set.
5 https://github.com/DIVA-DIA/DeepDIVA
6 https://github.com/
7 https://github.com/vinaychandranp/Are-You-Tampering-With-My-Data
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In Figure 4, we can see training and validation accuracy curves for a SIRRN
network on the CIFAR-10 dataset. The curves of the model trained on both
the original and tampered datasets look similar and do not exhibit a signifi-
cant difference in terms of performances. Hence we can asses that the tampering
procedure did not prevent the network from scoring as well as the baseline per-
formance, which is intended behaviour.
5.2 Trigger Strength and Causality Effectiveness
Next we want to measure the strength of the tampering and establish the causal-
ity magnitude. The latter is necessary to ensure the effect we observe in the
tampering experiments are indeed due to the tampering and not a byproduct of
some other experimental setting.
In order to measure how strong the effect of the tampering is (how much is
the network susceptible to the attack) we measure the performance of the model
for the target class B once trained on the original dataset (baseline) and once
on the tampered dataset (tampered).
Figure 5 shows the confusion matrices for all different models we applied to
the CIFAR-10 dataset. Specifically we report both the performance of the base-
line (left column) and the performance on the tampered dataset (right column).
Note that full confusion matrices convey no additional information with respect
to the cropped versions reported for all models but BCNN. In fact, since the
tampering has been performed on classes indexed 0 and 1 the relevant infor-
mation for this experiment is located in the first two rows which are shown in
Figures 5.c-l One can perform a qualitative evaluation of the strength of the
tampering by comparing the confusion matrices of models trained on tampered
data (Figure 5, right column) with the optimal result shown in Figure 3b.
Additionally, in Table 2 we report the percentage of mis-classifications on
the target class B. Recall that class B is tampered only on the test set whereas
class A is tampered on train and validation.
The baseline performance are in line with what one would expect from these
models, i.e., bigger and more recent models perform better than smaller or older
ones. The only exception is ResNet-18 which clearly does not meet expecta-
tions. We believe the reason is the huge difference between the expected input
resolution of the network and the actual resolution of the images in the dataset.
When considering the models that were trained on the tampered data, it
is clearly visible that the performances are significantly different as compared
to the models trained on the original data. Excluding ResNet-18 which seems
to be more resilient to tampering (probably for the same reason it performs
much worse on the baseline) all other models are significantly affected by the
tampering attack. Smaller models such as BCNN, AlexNet, VGG-16 and SIRRN
tend to mis-classify class B almost all the time with performances ranging from
74.1% to 98.9% of mis-classifications. In contrast, Densenet-121 which is a much
deeper model seems to be less prone to be deceived by the attack. Note, however,
that this model has a much stronger baseline and when put in perspective with
it class B get mis-classified ∼ 24 times more than on the baseline.
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(a) Baseline BCNN (b) Tampered BCNN
(c) Baseline AlexNet (d) Tampered AlexNet
(e) Baseline VGG-16 (f) Tampered VGG-16
(g) Baseline ResNet-18 (h) Tampered ResNet-18
(i) Baseline SIRRN (j) Tampered SIRRN
(k) Baseline DenseNet-121 (l) Tampered DenseNet-121
Fig. 5. Confusion matrices demonstrating the effectiveness of the tampering method
against all networks models we used on CIFAR-10. Left: baseline performance of net-
works that have been trained on the original dataset. Note how they exhibit normal
behaviour. Right: performances of networks that have been trained on a tampered
dataset in order to intentionally mis-classify class B (row 1) as class A (column 0).
Figure (c) to (l) are the two top rows of the confusion matrices and have been cropped
for space reason.
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Table 2. List of results for each model on both datasets. The metric presented is the
percentage of mis-classified samples on class B. Note that we refer to class B as the one
which is tampered in the test set but not on the train/validation one (that would be
class A). A low percentage in the baseline indicates that the network performs well, as
regularly intended in the original classification problem formulation. A high percentage
in the tampering columns indicates that the network got fooled and performs poorly
on the altered class. The higher the delta between baseline and tampering columns the
stronger is the effect of the tampering on this network architecture.
Model % Mis-classification on class B
Baseline Tampering
CIFAR SVHN CIFAR SVHN
Optimal Case 0 0 100 100
BCNN 28.7 12.9 87.2 91.4
AlexNet 11.1 5.5 83.7 97
VGG-16 5.3 3.7 90.1 98.9
ResNet-18 23.8 3.6 42.4 40.9
SIRRN 4.7 3.9 74.1 89.5
DenseNet-121 2.6 2.6 60.7 68.1
6 Discussion
The experiments shown in Section 5 clearly demonstrate that we one can com-
pletely change the behavior of a network by tampering just one single pixel of
the images in the training set. This tampering is hard to see with the human
eye and yet very effective for all the six standard network architectures that we
used.
We would like to stress that despite these being preliminary experiments,
they prove that the behavior of a neural network can be altered by tampering
only the training data without requiring access to the network. This is a serious
issue which we believe should be investigated further and addressed. While we
experimented with a single pixel based attack — which is reasonably simple
to defend against (see Section 6.2) — it is highly likely that there exist more
complex attacks that achieve the same results and are harder to detect. Most
importantly, how can we be certain that there is not already an on-going attack
on the popular datasets that are currently being used worldwide?
6.1 Limitations
The first limitation of the tampering that we used in our experiments is that
it can still be spotted even though it is a single pixel. One needs to be very
attentive to see it, but it is still possible.
Attention in neural networks [57] is known also to highlight the portions
of an input which contribute the most towards a classification decision. These
visualization could reveal the existence of the tampered pixel. However, one
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would need to check several examples of all classes to look for alterations and
this could be cumbersome and very time consuming. Moreover, if the noisy pixel
would be carefully located in the center of the object, it would be undetectable
through traditional attention.
Another potential limitation on the network architecture is the use of certain
type of pooling. Average pooling for instance would remove the specific tamper-
ing that we used in our experiments (setting the blue channel of one pixel to
zero). Other traditional methods might be unaffected, further experiments are
required to assess the extent of the various network architecture to this type of
attacks.
A very technical limitation is the file format of the input data. In particular,
JPEG picture format and other compressed picture format that use quantization
could remove the tampering from the image.
Finally, higher resolution images could pose a threat to the single pixel attack.
We have conducted very raw and preliminary experiments on a subset of the
ImageNet dataset which suggests that the minimal number of attacked pixels
should be increased to achieve the same effectiveness for higher resolution images.
6.2 Type of Defenses
A few strategies can be used to try to detect and prevent this kind of attacks.
Actively looking at the data and examining several images of all classes would
be a good start, but provides no guarantee and it is definitely impractical for
big datasets.
Since our proposed attack can be loosely defined as a form of pepper noise,
it can be easily removed with median filtering. Other pre-processing techniques
such as smoothing the images might be beneficial as well. Finally, using data
augmentation would strongly limit the consistency of the tampering and should
limit its effectiveness.
6.3 Future Work
Future work includes more in-depth experiments on additional datasets and with
more network architectures to gather insight on the tasks and training setups
that are subject to this kind of attacks.
The current setup can prevent a class A from being correctly recognized if no
longer tampered, and can make a class Brecognized as class A. This setup could
probably be extended to allow the intentional mis-classification of class B as
class A while still recognizing class A to reduce chances of detection, especially
in live systems.
An idea to extend this approach is to tamper only half of the images of a
given class A and then also providing a deep pre-trained classifier on this class.
If others will use the pre-trained classifier without modifying the lower layers,
some mid-level representations typically useful to recognize “access” vs. “no
access allowed”, it could happen that one will always gain access by presenting
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the modified pixel in the input images. This goes in the direction of model
tampering discussed in Section 2.4.
Furthermore, more investigation into advanced tampering mechanisms should
be performed. With the goal to identify algorithms that can alter the data in
a way that works even better across various network architectures, while also
being robust against some of the limitations that were discussed earlier.
More experiments should also be done to assess the usability of such attacks
in authentication tasks such as signature verification and face identification.
7 Conclusion
This paper is a proof-of-concept in which we want to raise awareness on the
widely underestimated problem of training a machine learning system on poi-
soned data. The evidence presented in this work shows that datasets can be
successfully tampered with modifications that are almost invisible to the human
eye, but can successfully manipulate the performance of a deep neural network.
Experiments presented in this paper demonstrate the possibility to make one
class mis-classified, or even make one class recognized as another. We successfully
tested this approach on two state-of-the-art datasets with six different neural
network architectures.
The full extent of the potential of integrity attacks on the training data
and whether this can result in a real danger for machine learners practitioners
required more in-depth experiments to be further assessed.
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